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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper introduces the main findings and methodology of a new large-scale pan European survey 
capturing citizens’ support for EUs efforts to reduce inequality between richer and poorer regions in 
Europe, cohesion policy. Despite that cohesion policy currently constitutes the 2nd larges budget 
item of the European Union, we know surprisingly little on about the level of public support for such 
redistribution. This major data collection effort was aimed at enhancing our understanding of citizen 
knowledge, attitudes and experience with Cohesion policy, along with potential determinants – both 
original to the project and others drawn from the literature – that are associated with support (or lack 
thereof) for the policy. In all, 17,147 interviews were carried out in 15 EU member states, which 
represent 85% of the total EU28 population. The results contribute towards a better understanding 
of some of the factors that may ultimately determine the level of redistribution and inequality in 
Europe, such as identification with Europe, utilitarian (self-interest) factors, political party support, 
and perceptions of the quality of government and corruption at regional, country, and EU level.  
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Introduction 
This paper introduces the main findings and methodology of a new large scale pan European survey 
capturing citizens’ support for EUs efforts to reduce inequality between richer and poorer regions in 
Europe, cohesion policy. In the spring of 2017, two researchers in the Horizon 2020 funded research 
program PERCEIVE (“Perception and evaluation of Regional and Cohesion Policies by Europeans 
and Identification with the values of Europe) from the Quality of Government (QoG) institute, 
Nicholas Charron and Monika Bauhr, crafted an original survey on public support for this policy. 
The survey’s main goal is to investigate citizen knowledge, attitudes and experience with Cohesion 
policy, along with elucidating factors – both original to the project and others drawn from the litera-
ture – that are associated with support (or lack thereof) for the policy.  The survey includes over 35 
substantive questions as well as seven demographic and background questions of the respondents.  
In all, 17,147 interviews were carried out in 15 EU member states, which represent 85% of the total 
EU28 population.   
Despite that cohesion policy currently constitutes the 2nd largest budget item of the European Union, 
and make up roughly one third of the EU budget, we know surprisingly little about the level of public 
support for such redistribution1. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first survey that attempts 
to directly capture attitudes towards EU Cohesion Policy.  While several rounds of Eurobarometer 
surveys have asked about awareness of EU Cohesion/Regional policy, the survey makes a significant 
contribution to our overall knowledge about public opinion on EU economic integration by directly 
asking about the extent to which citizens’ support this policy, as well as by including several both 
more established and novel potential explanatory factors.  
The questions included in the survey are grounded in the burgeoning academic literature on public 
support (and scepticism) for European Integration.  The aim is to provide researchers with as many 
tools as possible to test various theories about why citizens would support (or not) the idea of Cohe-
sion Policy.  Aside from several demographic questions, the substantive questions are on:  
 awareness of the policy in question,  
 perceptions of the biggest problem facing one’s region,  
                                                     
1 For a comparative perspective, the expenditures on Cohesion policy during the 2014-2020 budget period equate to 
roughly 57bil Euros per year, which is just greater than the total public annual expenditure of Finland in 2013 (OECD.stat) 
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 voting in EU elections,  
 evaluating one’s country’s EU membership, 
  Citizens’ identification Europe, country & region and European values 
 Political policy attitudes and values 
 Perceptions of corruption in governing bodies 
 Evaluations of the economy & one’s regional economic standing in the EU 
 Questions measuring support for Cohesion Policy & Brexit (UK only) 
The report is structured as follows. First, we include a brief motivation of the question blocks in-
cluded in the survey. Second, we highlight some of the main survey results. Next, we provide a more 
detailed background information on sampling strategies and demographics. Thereafter we delve more 
deeply into describing the results of each of the questions included in the survey.  
 
Motivation of question blocks 
The questions included in the survey are grounded in the academic literature on public support (and 
scepticism) for European Integration, and the questionnaire is a mix of novel and established ques-
tions.   As per accounting for established ideas, we draw on a rich literature of public support for EU 
integration, along with the emerging literature on public support for inter-EU economic redistribu-
tion and financial support (recently, see Bansak et al., 2016; Daniele and Geys, 2015; Stockel and 
Kuhn, 2017; Bauhr and Charron 2018).  In their recent overview of studies on public support for 
European integration, Hobolt and de Vries (2016:414) suggest that the literature explaining support 
has mainly focused on three types of explanations: utilitarian, identity-driven and “cue-taking and 
bench-marking with reference to the national political context”. In order to capture ‘utilitarian’/ self-
interest based motivations we included several survey items such as measures of income, level of 
education, respondents place in the labor market, and subjective views of the economic situation in 
their region (see Gabel 1998).  
This literature also highlights political attitudes, identity, values and ideology as having a strong ex-
planatory power (Hooghe and Marks 2005; 2009; McLaren, 2002).  Here we attempt to capture these 
established factors in several ways, along with incorporating newer ideas about European identity 
from the PERCEIVE group. As per established items, strong, exclusive national identity with one’s 
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country is often found to be a critical negative predictor of support for EU policies and, conversely, 
strong identification or attachment with Europe tends to correlate with support for further policy 
integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2014).  In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to 
place their attachment to three levels of governance – regional, national and European on a 0-10 
scale.  One’s political party also serves as an important heuristic as citizens tend to take cues from 
the platforms of party elites (Steenburg and Jones 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2009) and several studies 
have found that ‘cue taking’ effects regarding EU support work through one’s preferred political 
party (Hobolt 2007; Stoeckel and Kuhn 2017). We therefore inquire about which party the respond-
ents support. Furthermore, political values may also explain support for cohesion policy, and we 
designed several questions in the survey to account for the ‘gal-tan’ dimension (Kitschelt 1994)2, as 
respondents with higher ‘tan’ values have found to be both less supportive of EU integration and 
more prone to perceive institutions as more corrupt (Hooghe and Marks 2009).  Left-right ideology 
and preferences for domestic redistribution could also play a role in preferences for a redistributive 
policy such as Cohesion policy (Bansak et al 2016).  We account for this factor via a question on the 
extent to which respondent’s feel their own government should ‘take measures to reduce income 
levels’ in their country (0-10).   We also included several, more in-depth questions about specific 
channels of European identity, with five questions drawn up by the researchers of PERCEIVE, 
meant to capture various dimensions of European identity, such as civic, cultural and utilitarian based 
identification with the EU (Bruter 2003).  
Another interesting line of research in the EU public opinion literature is the extent to which citizens 
use domestic proxies to determine their support for EU integration and various policies (Anderson 
1998; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).  Here we are interested in incorporating our ideas about perceptions 
of institutional quality (‘Quality of Government’, QoG) and corruption in a multi-level structure.  We 
ask respondents about the extent to which they perceive corruption in their own national and regional 
governing institutions, as well as in those of the European Union 
The main questions on attitudes and support for Cohesion Policy is included toward the end of the 
survey and constitute a novel contribution to the research field.  Building on a wealth of research 
investigating support for domestic redistribution, we anticipate that the extent to which one supports 
                                                     
2 The survey questions regard the extent to which people feel the Christian religion is an essential ‘European value’, the 
extent to which respondents want to’ restrict immigration’ and the extent to which respondents would prefer a ‘strong 
leader’ who can ‘get things done in spite of parliamentary rules of elections’. The question formulations are found in the 
appendix.   
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a redistributive-type policy such as Cohesion depends in part on perceptions of one’s own regional 
status (Cruces et al 2013; Balcells et al 2015).  Thus prior to the two main questions about attitudes 
towards Cohesion Policy, respondents were also asked to place their region within four groups in 
terms of GDP per capita – the wealthiest 25% of EU regions, the second wealthiest, the third, and 
then the poorest 25% of EU regions.  This question helps us capture the extent to which perceptions 
of regional wealth might determine support for CP rather than ‘actual’ GDP per capita.  We then 
proceed to ask about support for Cohesion policy and the extent to which citizens would like their 
country to invest more/less in the policy idea. We follow up these questions with several, short ques-
tions intended to draw out several interesting additional mechanisms potentially explaining support 
for economic integration, which we describe at the end of this paper.  The survey concludes with a 
question exclusive to UK respondents about Brexit voting and several demographic questions.   
In the next section, we summarize the main findings and in subsequent sections we highlight some 
of the findings in each of the survey blocks, with a focus on sample and country-wide results.  
Result Highlights 
While undoubtedly researchers within and outside of the PERCEIVE group will present more nu-
anced findings based on the data in this survey, an early look at the data point to several interesting 
findings.  Below, we highlight some of these results.   
First, as several Eurobarometer survey prior to this survey, we asked about general awareness of the 
EU Cohesion policy.   We find – similar to previous Eurobarometer investigations - that on average, 
just under half of the respondents have heard of the name “Cohesion Policy”   or “Structural Funds”, 
while roughly half have heard the term “Regional Policy”. Moreover, there is remarkable country 
level variation in this awareness – in countries such as the UK and Netherlands, less than 25% report 
awareness even on  this superficial level, while in countries such as Poland, about two thirds (or more) 
claim they have heard of all three policy names.  In addition, we also ask whether citizens have ever 
heard of any EU funded project in the area in which they live – and again, we find remarkable varia-
tion.  While about 80% or more said ‘yes’ to this question in countries like Poland, Hungary and 
Slovakia, less than 30% said that they have ever hear about any EU funded project in Germany, 
Netherlands or the UK.  This might be expected however given the skewed distribution of the Struc-
tural Funds toward lesser developed regions.  We also asked about whether people who have heard 
of an EU funded project in their area also perceive that they have in fact benefitted from it. A majority 
of respondents from Poland, Estonia, Slovakia and Hungary answered  ‘yes’ to this question, while 
  7 
less than half of the respondents who have heard of an EU project in their area in all other countries 
claimed that they personal benefit from such investments.   Remarkably, only 11% of Italians who 
have heard of a local EU project claim that they have personally benefitted from it.   
Second, we were also interested in what policy problems that citizens themselves highlight as most 
pressing for their area and which level of governance – regional, national or EU – that they have 
most confidence in in terms of dealing with said problems.  In most countries, unemployment was 
perceived as being the most pressing problem facing one’s area, followed by ‘low wages and poverty’.  
In Romania, ‘corruption’ was highlighted as the most pressing problem by a plurality of respondents, 
while in the UK it was poor infrastructure and transportation.  However, most citizens believe that 
their regional governments are best equipped to handle the problem they highlighted as most press-
ing, with just under 60% saying that the regional level will be “very effective” or “somewhat effective” 
in addressing their main concern.  On the other hand, only 44% say the same about the EU – which 
was the lowest rated of the three levels – and 56% claim that the EU will be ‘not so effective’ in 
addressing their main concern. Romanian were most optimistic about the EU’s ability to address their 
main concerns, while a clear majority of Italians, Britons and Swedes were sceptical of the EU’s ability 
to address the problems that they perceived as most pressing.  
Third, despite the relative lack in confidence about the policy capacities of the EU, most citizens – 
63% -still believe that their country’s EU membership is a ‘good thing’, while 13% said a ‘bad thing’ 
and 22% said ‘neither’.3 Perceptions of EU membership being a good thing is particularly pro-
nounced among people with higher education and those living in more urban areas.  Moreover, there 
are some fairly strong country differences in this response as well, with over 70% of Polish, Romanian 
and German citizens claiming that their country’s EU membership is a ‘good thing’ while less than 
40% of Italians say so.  
Fourth, we asked a number of questions about identity and political values – accounting for potential 
explanations as to why certain individuals would be more open to the idea of Cohesion Policy; es-
sentially economic integration and redistribution within the EU.   As Cohesion is about ‘multilevel 
governance’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009), we asked them about their attachment to Europe, their own 
country and their region. Although there is much variation, we found that the nation state was still 
                                                     
3
 This is slightly different than a 2017 Eurobarometer3, which found that 57% responded ‘good thing’, 14% ‘bad thing’ and 
27% ‘neither’ (however, Greece, Croatia and Czech Republic, three of the four most sceptic countries are not included in 
our sample, which could help explain our higher ‘good thing’ average). 
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on average the unit with which people felt most strongly attached, followed by the region and then 
to Europe, although the order is different for some countries, such as Italy, where people on average 
most strongly identified with their region.  In addition, respondents were asked about the extent to 
which several items were important to ‘being European’, including the Euro, Christianity, the Euro-
pean flag, having a common history and the right for all EU citizens to live and work in any other 
EU country.  Our sample-wide results point to ‘the right for all EU citizens to live and work in any 
other EU country’ as clearly the most important aspect of what it means to ‘be European’ today, 
suggesting the positive effects of common market, while ‘Christianity’ and a common EU flag were 
the least important to people in this regard.    
Finally, gauging support for the idea of Cohesion policy presents several challenges.  First, as our 
own and past Eurobarometer surveys have shown, awareness of this policy is relatively low among 
most Europeans, thus any direct question about Cohesion Policy would probably lead to rather in-
valid results.  Second, Cohesion Policy benefits regions in the EU in very different ways, with lesser 
developed regions receiving the majority of funds.  To assume that all citizens are aware of their 
region’s relative status within the EU is also problematic, as some might support/not support the 
idea of Cohesion Policy simply because they perceive their region to be wealthier/poorer than it 
actually is.  We attempted to remedy these two potential pitfalls by first asking respondents to place 
their region into one of four groups – the wealthiest 25% to the poorest 25% of all EU regions so 
that we could then take into consideration their perceptions in future analyses.  We then randomly 
gave some respondents the actual correct information, and let other respondents proceed without 
such information so as to test ‘rational’ models of support for redistribution within the EU and in-
clude an experimental component to the data.  Next, we provided all respondents with some basic 
summary information about Cohesion Policy.  Citizens were then asked if they thought that the EU 
should continue such a policy on a four-point scale – from ‘strongly agree to strongly disagree’.  In-
terestingly, we find fairly widespread support for the idea of Cohesion policy – about 27% of re-
spondents ‘strongly agree’ with the idea, and 52% agree, while 15% disagree and roughly 5% strongly 
disagree.  1% did not know.  On average, the Dutch were the least supportive, while the Slovaks and 
Romanians were the most supportive.   
Next, citizens were asked a question that attempted to account for the ‘intensity’ of their support for 
this idea - whether they would like tax money from their own countries to go more, about the same 
or less toward this policy.  The results show that just under 59% would like their country’s to spend 
about the same toward this policy, while 24% want their country to spend less, and just 18% would 
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want their country to spend more.  The Dutch were most inclined to say that they wanted their 
country to spend less (39%)  and least inclined to say that they wanted their country to spend more 
(5%), while Romanians were most enthusiastic about this policy – 36% wanted Romania to invest 
more in Cohesion Policy, while only 6% wanted to spend less.  Overall, we might conclude that there 
is at least a high degree of passive support for the main policy in question, while we find that about 
20-25% (depending on the question) express opposition to Cohesion Policy.  
Background and general survey information 
The PERCEIVE original survey is intended to help researchers better understand the micro and 
macro level dynamics that drive support (or lack thereof) of EU regional polices.  The survey includes 
over 35 substantive questions as well as seven demographic and background questions of the re-
spondent.  Each respondent is geo-coded at the NUTS 1, NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 level.  The survey 
questionnaire was originally written by scholars at the University of Gothenburg, Nicholas Charron 
and Monika Bauhr, with help and feedback from various PERCEIVE partners.  The fieldwork was 
conducted during the summer of 2017 by an international survey firm based in Rheims, France (Ef-
ficience3, ‘E3’).   The results were returned to the Quality of Government (QoG) institute at the 
University of Gothenburg in September, 2017.   
E3 conducted the interviews themselves in several countries and used sub-contracting partners in 
others4.  In all, 17,147 interviews were carried out in 15 EU member states.  The respondents, from 
18 years of age or older, were contacted randomly via telephone in the local language. Telephone 
interviews approximately 12-15 minutes in length were conducted via both landlines and mobile 
phones, with both methods being used in most countries.  All interviews were made by employees 
with at least one year of professional experience and used Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing 
(CATI).  Between 12%-15% of all interviews were randomly check for quality control by supervisors, 
with no reported irregularities. Decisions about whether to contact residents more often via land or 
mobile lines was based on local expertise of market research firms in each country, with mobile being 
first choice in all cases.  For purposes of regional placement, respondents were asked the post code 
of their address to verify the area/ region of residence if mobile phones were used.   
Sampling method 
                                                     
4 http://www.efficience3.com/en/accueil/index.html. For names of the specific firms to which Efficience 3 sub-contracted 
in individual countries, please write cati@efficience3.com  
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Ideally, a survey would be a mirror image of actual societal demographics – gender, income, educa-
tion, rural-urban, ethnicity, etc.  However, sampling on demographics is much more costly.   We thus 
sought the next best solution. Based on E3’s expert advice, to achieve a random sample, we used 
what was known in survey-research as the ‘next birthday method’.  The next birthday method is an 
alternative to the so-called quotas method.  When using the quota method for instance, one obtains 
a (near) perfectly representative sample – e.g. a near exact proportion of the amount of men, women, 
certain minority groups, people of a certain age, income, etc. However, as one searches for certain 
demographics within the population, one might end up with only ‘available’ respondents, or those 
that are more ‘eager’ to respond to surveys, which can lead to less variation in the responses, or even 
bias in the results.  The ‘next-birthday’ method, which simply requires the interviewer to ask the 
person who answers the phone who in their household will have the next birthday, still obtains a 
reasonably representative sample of the population.  The interviewer must take the person who has 
the next coming birthday in the household (if this person is not available, the interviewer makes an 
appointment), thus not relying on whomever might simply be available to respond in the household.  
So, where the quota method is stronger in terms of a more even demographic spread in the sample, 
the next-birthday method is stronger at ensuring a better range of opinion.   
The next-birthday method was thus chosen because we felt that what we might have lost in demo-
graphic representation in the sample would be made up for by a better distribution of opinion.  In 
attempt to compensate for some key demographic over/under-representation, we provide weights 
based on age and gender for each region (see PSweight in supplemental section of this document), 
comparing the sample drawn to actual demographic statistics from Eurostat.  In the end, we find 
variation in response and refusal rates by country, which could have to do with many factors including 
the sensitivity of one of the primary the topics at hand – corruption. A breakdown of the sample 
response rate, land line vs. mobile phone use, etc. is listed in the table below by country.  
Sample and further survey information 
The survey included 15 EU countries, shown in Table 1.  These 15 countries in this sample represent 
over 85% of the proportion of the EU population.  Countries were selected for purposes of the cases 
study report countries as well as on the bases of variation with respect to geography, size, and insti-
tutional quality.   
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The design however was somewhat unique, and could be described as semi-stratified in some cases.  
To aid in research of the PERCEIVE project’s pre-selected case study regions, at least 500 randomly 
drawn respondents were taken from each of the select regions.  All other respondents were taken 
randomly throughout each country.  Thus for countries such as Germany or France with no pre-
selected regions, the respondents were randomly drawn.  In the case of Spain for example, at least 
500 would be taken from its pre-selected region (Extremadura) and then he other 150 respondents 
would be taken at random (including Extremadura).  The countries in the sample of this survey are 
the following and they are often refereed to via the following official abbreviations: 
              TABLE 1, (SAMPLE INFORMATION) 
 
  
Country Abbreviation Respondents 
Austria AT 1000 
Bulgaria BG 503 
Estonia EE 5000 
France FR 1500 
Germany DE 1500 
Hungary HU 1000 
Italy IT 2000 
Latvia LV 500 
Netherlands NL 500 
Poland PL 2000 
Romania RO 1015 
Slovakia SK 1014 
Spain ES 2014 
Sweden SE 580 
UK UK 1500 
    total= 17147 
Case Study Region 
  
Burgenland AT11 517 
Extremadura ES43 541 
Emilia-Romania ITD5 581 
Calabria ITF6 535 
Dolnoslaski PL51 579 
Warmińsko-mazurskie PL62 538 
Sud Est RO22 532 
Norra Mellansverige. SE31 516 
Essex UKH3 524 
 
Table 2 highlights the sample distribution of the demographic and general background questions in 
the survey.  50.5% of respondents and female, while 49.5 are male.  16.5% are under 30, while 23.7% 
are 65 and older.  20.2% have less than a secondary degree, while just over 14% have some post-
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tertiary education.  The average respondent has lived in the area where the interview was conducted 
for just less than 36 years, and has spent roughly 81% of their life in that residence.  A plurality of 
respondents (38.1%) comes from a residence between 10,000 and 100,000 inhabitants.  Based on 
Eurostat figures for incomes in each country, E3 divided respondents into three groups – low, middle 
and high, which were roughly evenly distributed, with high being slightly more represented.  20.4% 
work in the public sector, while 25.7% and 11% work in the private sector and are self-employed 
respectively.  6.1% are unemployed and 26.4% are retired.   
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TABLE 2, (SAMPLE WIDE DEMOGRAPHICS) 
Demographic category  Sample wide percentage (unweighted) 
Gender      
Female  50.5  
Male  49.5  
Age      
18-29  16.5  
30-49  32.7  
50-64  27  
65+  23.7  
Education      
<secondary   20.2  
Secondary  36.5  
Tertiary  28.9  
post-grad  14.2  
d/k  0.1  
Time lived in residence      
mean   35.9 (years) 
 
mean/respondent age  81(%) 
 
Population      
<10k  32.8  
10k-100k  38.1  
100k-1m  20.3  
>1m  7.5  
d/k  1.2 
 
Income      
Low  28.6 
 
Medium  28.7 
 
High  35.3 
 
d/k  7.4 
 
Employment      
public sector employee  20.4 
 
private sector employee  25.7 
 
self-employed  11 
 
unemployed  6.1 
 
housewife/husband  4.2 
 
Retired  26.4 
 
student/trainee  4.1 
 
Other  2.1 
 
 
 
 
Main Survey results by question 
I. General Awareness of EU Regional Policy and Perceived Personal Benefits 
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In the first four questions, respondents were asked about their general level of awareness about EU 
funded policies and the extent to which they perceived that they had personally benefited from these 
policies 
In general, have you ever heard about the following EU policies? (yes, no) a. EU Cohesion Policy, b. EU Regional 
Policy, c. Structural Funds , d. any EU funded project in your region or area? 
TABLE 3, (SUMMARY OF AWARNESS QUESTION BY COUNTRY AND TOTAL PROPORTIONS)  
 
COUNTRY 
EU Cohesion  
Policy 
EU Regional  
Policy Structural Funds 
any EU funded 
project 
France 0.493 0.323 0.306 0.378 
Bulgaria 0.241 0.483 0.377 0.639 
Slovakia 0.383 0.704 0.677 0.871 
Hungary 0.517 0.578 0.387 0.817 
Romania 0.188 0.314 0.504 0.395 
Italy 0.500 0.502 0.605 0.621 
Netherlands 0.178 0.334 0.240 0.213 
Sweden 0.335 0.518 0.287 0.421 
UK 0.212 0.342 0.257 0.252 
Latvia 0.536 0.580 0.696 0.705 
Poland 0.626 0.644 0.750 0.779 
Spain 0.599 0.442 0.615 0.613 
Germany 0.396 0.455 0.452 0.293 
Estonia 0.603 0.575 0.532 0.589 
Austria 0.482 0.619 0.476 0.315 
     
Weighted Total 0.452 0.455 0.481 0.480 
 
 
The results vary substantially between the surveyed countries. In the Netherlands, only around 18 
per cent of respondents answered that they have heard about EU Cohesion Policy, while 63 per cent 
of the Polish respondents have heard about EU cohesion policy. Both Spain and Estonia have similar 
figures, where 60%, a clear majority of the population, have heard about the policy Furthermore, 
relatively few respondents in Romania and the UK have heard about cohesion policy (19 and 21 per 
cent respectively). On average, less than half of the respondents in the EU wide sample (45 per cent) 
have heard about this policy, which is consistent with previous Eurobarometer findings.  Looking at 
the respondents answer on whether or not they have heard about EU regional policy, the figure 
shows that, again, relatively few of the respondents in the Romania, France, Netherlands, and the 
UK have heard about EU regional policy (31, 32, 33, and 34 per cent respectively). These figures 
could be contrasted to the share of respondent in Slovakia (70 per cent) or Poland (64 per cent), 
where a clear majority answered that they had heard about this policy, showing that the terminology 
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(‘Cohesion policy’ versus ‘regional policy’) is important in policy recognition within certain countries.  
The EU average for this question is 45.5 per cent. 
As per Structural Funds, we observe substantial country level variation.  Relatively few respondents 
in the Netherlands (24 per cent), the UK (26 per cent), Sweden (29 per cent) and France (31 per cent) 
had heard about these funds. Again, a large share of the Polish population, 75 per cent, had heard 
about the Structural Funds.  Similarly, 69 per cent of respondents in Latvia and 68 per cent of re-
spondents in Slovakia had heard about the Structural Funds. The weighted sample average for the 
question on whether respondents had heard about the Structural Funds or not are 48 per cent.  Fi-
nally, the data shows that as much as 87 per cent of Slovakian respondents have hear of EU funded 
projects in their region/ area, while only 21 per cent have heard of such projects in the Netherlands. 
Thus, while only around a fifth of the respondents in countries such as the Netherlands, UK and 
Germany have heard about EU funded projects in their area, a large majority of the population have 
heard about EU funded projects in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. 
Q2.  (if yes on Q1_4) Where did you hear about the project in your region?  
TV, billboard, print or online newspaper, Social media, workplace, radio, Other  
 
TABLE 4, (WEIGHTED SAMPLE AVERGES) 
 
Source % 
TV 30.0 
Billboard 10.7 
Print/online newspapers 23.1 
Social media 5.8 
Workplace 11.6 
Radio 4.4 
Other 14.4 
note: total n = 9,346   
 
Table 4 shows respondents answer to where they had heard about the EU funded project in their area. 
30 per cent of respondents that had heard of a EU funded project in their region or area had heard 
about in on TV, and 23,1 per cent had heard about EU funded projects in print/online newspapers. 
Fewer respondents reported that they had heard about EU funded projects through their workplace 
(11,6 per cent), billboards (10 per cent), social media (5,8 per cent) or radio (4,4 per cent). 14,4 per 
cent of the respondents had heard about an EU funded projects through other channels than the 
ones mentioned above. 
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Table 5 shows the extent to which participants in the different surveyed countries perceive that they 
have benefited from EU funded projects in their daily life. The column to the left is for the full 
sample and the column to the right shows the number among participants that have heard of any EU 
funded project in their region or area. While it is possible to perceive that you generally benefit from 
projects in your daily life without having heard about a particular project, the column to the right 
shows the answer among participants that presumably have more concrete knowledge about the kind 
of projects that could be referred to. Participants in Poland, Estonia and Slovakia perceive that they 
have benefited most from EU projects in their daily life while only between approximately10 and 20 
per cent of participants in Austria, Romania, Germany, France the Netherlands and Italy perceive 
that they have benefitted in their daily life from EU funded projects. Interestingly, the difference that 
it makes to have heard about an EU funded project in your area/region on participants assessment 
of the extent to which they benefit in their daily life from these projects is large in countries such as 
the Netherlands and Germany. In Romania, by contrast, there is hardly any difference between the 
two groups. 
Q3. To your knowledge, have you ever benefited in your daily life from any project funded by the EU?  Yes; No; Don’t 
know 
 
TABLE 5, (WEIGHTED COUNTRY AVERAGES) 
Country  Proportion 'benefit' 
Proportion benefit  
(of only ’yes’ Q1d) 
Poland 0.72 0.77 
Estonia 0.60 0.69 
Slovakia 0.56 0.60 
Hungary 0.53 0.60 
Latvia 0.49 0.57 
Bulgaria 0.45 0.52 
Spain 0.28 0.39 
UK 0.30 0.52 
Sweden 0.28 0.50 
Austria 0.23 0.27 
Romania 0.21 0.19 
Germany 0.19 0.33 
France 0.16 0.28 
Netherlands 0.15 0.38 
Italy 0.11 0.12 
Weighted total 0.26 0.39 
Note: n= 9,346 in the column among respondents who ‘have heard’ about a project in their area. 
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II. Perceptions of biggest problems facing one’s region & government effectiveness 
The next set of questions deals with respondent’s views about the most pressing issues that their 
region faces (among issues that the EU Regional policy engages with) and confidence with various 
levels of governance in dealing with these issues.  
Q4. In the past 5 years or so, which of the following do you think has been the biggest problem 
facing your region? (randomized order) 
a. poor education 
b. Poor infrastructure & transportation 
c. corruption  and poor governance  
d. unemployment 
e. environmental concerns 
f. poor wages/ poverty 
g. other 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1, (SAMPLE-WIDE RESOINS, WEIGHTED) 
 
 
Figure 1 shows participants perceptions of what the biggest problem facing their region has been for 
the past five years. The sample wide weighted average responses show that by far the most important 
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perceived problem is unemployment, with 33 per cent picking unemployment as the most important 
problem. Around 15 per cent of respondents answer that wages/poverty infrastructure & transpor-
tation and corruption are important problems, indicating that governance issues are almost as salient 
to participants as wages/ poverty and infrastructure/ transportation. 9 respectively 8 per cent of the 
sample perceived that education and environmental concern was the biggest problem that has been 
facing their region for past five years. 
FIGURE 2, (MOST PRESSING ISSUE BY COUNTRY) 
 
 
Note: weighted averages, highest priority labeled in percent 
Figure 2 breaks down the answer to the question on perceptions of the most pressing problem facing 
the region by country. The figure shows important differences between the countries surveyed. The 
figure shows that in particular participants in Italy, Spain, France and Sweden perceive that unem-
ployment has been the most pressing issue, while participants in Estonia, Bulgaria and Hungary; 
instead, perceive that poor wages & poverty as their greatest concern.  
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Q5. How effective do you think the following institutions will be at dealing with the biggest problem in your region? (1. 
very effective, 2. somewhat effective, 3. not so effective) 
a. The European Union, b. (COUNTRY’s) national governing institutions, c. Your regional/local governing 
institutions 
 
TABLE 6 (PROPORTIONS WHO RESPOND “NOT SO EFFECTICE BY GOVERNANCE LEVEL) 
  
COUNTRY EU 
 
National  
 
Regional 
France 0.67 
 
0.54 
 
0.38 
Bulgaria 0.32 
 
0.29 
 
0.33 
Slovakia 0.32 
 
0.53 
 
0.49 
Hungary 0.72 
 
0.66 
 
0.59 
Romania 0.10 
 
0.26 
 
0.26 
Italy 0.76 
 
0.79 
 
0.70 
Netherlands 0.46 
 
0.24 
 
0.25 
Sweden 0.65 
 
0.39 
 
0.34 
UK 0.62 
 
0.46 
 
0.40 
Latvia 0.57 
 
0.62 
 
0.47 
Poland 0.49 
 
0.58 
 
0.42 
Spain 0.29 
 
0.36 
 
0.31 
Germany 0.60 
 
0.42 
 
0.31 
Estonia 0.51 
 
0.41 
 
0.33 
Austria 0.66 
 
0.56 
 
0.31 
  
 
 
 
 
Weighted Total 0.56 
 
0.51 
 
0.41 
 
Participants were also asked to evaluate the effectiveness of different institutions in dealing with the 
biggest problem of their region. Perhaps not surprisingly, rather few participants perceived that any 
of the institutions suggested were very effective in dealing with the problem. However, participants 
were somewhat more likely to perceive that the regional or local institutions were very effective in 
dealing with this problem, with 16 per cent of the sample selecting this option. However an interest-
ing pattern emerge if the effective (very or somewhat) category is collapsed and compared to the not 
so effective category, shown in table 6. Here we can see a clear divide among participants in the 
extent to which they evaluated institutions as effective or not. A slight majority, 56 per cent, of the 
participants believed that the EU was not effective in dealing with this problem, while 44 per cent 
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believed that the EU was somewhat or very effective.  The corresponding numbers for national 
institutions is 51 per cent perceiving that national level institutions was ineffective, and 49 per cent 
perceiving that they were effective. Regional or local institutions were perceived as somewhat more 
effective than both national and EU level institutions: 59 per cent of the participants answered that 
local and regional institutions were very or somewhat effective in dealing with the problem at hand. 
III. Voting behavior 
Respondents were asked about voting in national and EU elections, as this gives us insights 
about both their level of electoral engagement at the EU level as well as their partisan lean-
ings.  
Q6: Turning a bit to politics, what political party would you vote for if the national parliamentary election were to-
morrow? (provide current party list by country) 
Q7: Now thinking about EU elections, have you voted in either of the last two EU parliamentary elections? (2014, 
2009, neither, d/k) 
 
Table 7 compares the mean response of ‘voted both times’ in the last two elections with actual voter 
turnouts in EU parliamentary elections.  In seven cases, we find that the difference between the 
extent to which participants reported to have voted and actual voting levels is over ten percent, with 
Bulgarians, Slovakians, Polish and Romanians reporting considerably higher rates of voting than their 
actual level of voting.  Italy, France and Germany more accurately repored their voting levels, since 
reported voting do not differ more than  around 3% from actual voting levels , while respondents in 
Austria and Sweden actually voted more than what participants reported.  
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TABLE 7, (RESPONDENT VOTING AND ACTUAL VOTER TURNOUT IN EU ELECTIONS: 2009 & 2014) 
Country Weighted country mean 'voted twice' Ave. actual turnout (2009 & 2014) 
Difference (claimed vote %- ac-
tual turnout %) 
BG 63.4 37.4 26.0 
SK 42.1 16.4 25.8 
RO 55.1 29.6 25.6 
PL 47.9 24.2 23.8 
HU 51.2 33.1 18.2 
NL 54.6 37.1 17.6 
ES 55.1 44.4 10.8 
UK 43.6 35.2 8.5 
EE 45.3 40.2 5.1 
LV 45.5 42.0 3.5 
FR 45.8 42.8 3.1 
IT 62.1 61.2 0.9 
DE 43.2 45.7 -2.5 
AT 40.8 45.7 -4.9 
SE 42.5 48.2 -5.7 
    
Note: source of EU election turnout: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-introduction-2014.html  
 
IV. Evaluating One’s Country’s EU membership 
Respondents were subsequently asked a standard question about whether or not they believe that 
their country’s membership in the EU is a good or bad thing (or whther they were not sure).   
Q8: In general, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY’S) EU membership is: a good thing, a bad thing, neither 
good nor bad, not sure. (UK not included). 
Participants in the survey (with the exception of participants from the UK) were also asked to eval-
uate if they though their country’s membership in the European Union was a good or bad thing. 
They were also given the option of answering neither good nor bad and not sure. The share of re-
spondents picking the not sure option was very small (1 per cent). 63 per cent of the respondents 
thought their country’s membership in the EU was a good thing, while 13 per cent thought it was a 
bad thing. 22 percent of survey participants reported that they thought their country’s membership 
was neither good nor bad.  
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FIGURE 3, (SAMPLE WIDE RESULTS) 
 
Note: country population weighted averages by response 
V. Citizens’ identification Europe, country & region and European values 
Participants were also asked to express their levels of identification with their region, their country 
and Europe. Figure 4 thus shows the extent to which citizens have overlapping identities and if they 
feel more attached to any of these entities. The figure shows participants average response on the 0-
10 scale, with ‘0’ being ‘I don’t identify at all, and ‘10’ being ‘I identify very strongly’. On average, 
participants’ expressed a somewhat stronger level of identification with their country (7,3) than with 
their region (6,6) or Europe (6,3).  The figure shows, among other things that national level identifi-
cation is prominent in most countries included, with the exception of Italy and Poland where regional 
level identification was slightly higher. Furthermore, the level of regional identification played a rela-
tively important role in Spain and the Netherlands. In no country was the level of identification with 
Europe higher than national level identification, but in some countries it played an as large or greater 
role than regional level identification, including Slovenia and Germany. 
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Q9: People may feel different degrees of identity with their region, their country, or with Europe on whole.  On a 0-10 
scale, with ‘0’ being ‘I don’t identify at all, and ‘10’ being ‘I identify very strongly’, how strongly you identify yourself 
with the following?: 
a. Your region, b. Your country, c. Europe 
FIGURE 4, (SUMMARY PF IDENTIFICATION BY COUNTRY  
 
Note: weighted means reported by response and country. (0-10 scale, higher scores = stronger identity) 
Q10: People have many different opinions about what ‘being European’ means.  On a scale from 0-10, where ‘0’ 
means “not at all important” and ‘10’ means “very important”, how important are the following for you in terms of 
‘being European’?  
a. The right for all EU citizens to live and work in any other EU country 
b. Having the common Euro currency 
c. The Christian religion  
d. Having a common European flag and passport 
e. Sharing a common European history and culture 
 
Participants were also asked what “being European” means to them, and where asked to express 
their opinion on a number of alternatives. In Table 8, we see that participants on average perceived 
the right to live and work in any other European county as the most important aspect of being Eu-
ropean. In particular in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Spain participants expressed that this was an important 
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aspect of being European. On average, having a common Euro currency and having a common 
European history and culture was perceived as the second important aspect of what it means to be 
European (although the Euro was clearly less important within the two countries that have chosen 
to opt out: Sweden and the UK). Participants on average attached less importance to the Christian 
religion and having a common European flag and passport.  In all cases but three, respondents ranked 
the right to live and work in other EU countries as most important among the five items, whereas 
France, Austria and Netherlands’ respondents ranked the Euro currency as most important. 
TABLE 8, (COUNTRY AND SAMPLE WIDE AVERAGES) 
 
Note: 0-10 scale, higher scores = more importance.   High and low country means for each question are in red and blue respectively.  
*indicates item that ranks highest within countries 
 
 
 
Q11: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people? Using a scale on which 0 means that “you can’t be too careful in dealing with people” and 10 means that 
“most people can be trusted”, where would you locate yourself on this scale? 
COUNTRY 
a. right to live and 
work in any other 
EU country 
b. common Euro 
currency c. Christian religion  
d. common Euro-
pean flag  
e. common Euro-
pean history and 
culture 
Austria 7.5 7.7* 5.4 5.3 6.2 
Bulgaria 8.9* 4.3 7.8 4.6 5.5 
Estonia 8.0* 7.5 4.4 5.4 6.0 
France 7.1 7.5* 4.2 6.3 6.5 
Germany 7.9* 7.7 4.7 5.5 6.4 
Hungary 7.9* 5.9 6.9 6.1 7.6 
Italy 7.7* 6.2 6.6 6.2 6.9 
Latvia 7.5* 7.4 5.7 5.3 6.3 
Netherlands 6.2 6.3* 4.4 4.7 5.3 
Poland 8.4* 4.7 6.5 6.0 7.0 
Romania 8.7* 5.6 6.6 3.6 3.7 
Slovakia 9.0* 8.3 6.4 4.9 6.9 
Spain 8.6* 7.7 4.6 6.3 7.3 
Sweden 7.1* 3.2 3.1 2.7 5.2 
UK 7.1* 3.5 4.0 3.5 6.2 
      
weighted sample means 7.8 6.4 5.3 5.5 6.4 
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FIGURE 5, (GENERALIZED TRUST ACROSS COUNTRIES  
 
In question 11, respondents are asked a question about generalized (social) trust, e.g. the extent to 
which they ‘trust others’ in their area.  The weighted sample mean is 6.2 and the figure above shows 
the variation across countries.  As shown in figure 5, we find that in Hungary, Romania, France and 
Slovakia demonstrate the lowest social trust, while German, Austria and the UK have the highest 
levels of social trust on average.   
VI. Political Policy attitudes and values 
A substantial amount of research in recent years has asserted and found evidence for the idea that 
people with certain value sets are more likely to support European integration than others (Ingelhart 
1997; Hooghe and Marks 2009).  In addition to values that respondents associate with Europe from 
Q10, they are also asked about select political values that we suspect might be relevant in explaining 
support for EU policies such as Cohesion.  Here they are asked about their views on immigration, 
within-country redistribution and their preferences for a ‘strong leader’, the latter of which captures 
preferences for authoritarian rule. Q12 and Q14 can help capture the so called ‘gal-tan’ political di-
mension, while Q13 is relevant to the main topic of the survey because it helps identify people who 
support redistributive policies in general within their own country.   
Q12-Q14: Political Values 
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Q12. (COUNTRY) should have more restrictions on immigration than it does today 
 
Q13. (COUNTRY’s) national government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels among 
people in (COUNTRY) 
 
        Q14.  (COUNTRY) should have a strong leader that can solve problems quickly, who does not have to worry 
about elections and parliamentary rules. 
 
Table 9 show the country averages for the three questions with the sample mean at the bottom.  The 
responses to  Q13 on preferences for income redistribution within one’s own country, show that the 
vast majority of Europeans agree with this idea to some degree, with the mean response being 7.6, 
and all countries having an average of over the midpoint value (‘5’).  The UK has the lowest support 
for domestic income redistribution, while Romania shows the highest support.  We find however 
quite stark variation across countries on Q12 and Q14.  On more restrictive immigration policies, we 
find that Bulgarians are 3.6 point on the 11-point scale more supportive than Poland, which shows 
the least support for more restrictions on immigration.  In terms of the question capturing prefer-
ences for the need of a “strong leader” (Q14), we find even greater variation, with respondents in 
countries like Sweden, Austria and Germany showing strong disagreement with the statement (all 
lower than 3.5 on average), while Latvians, Bulgarians and Romanians show strong support for this 
idea on average, with country means at 7.9 or above.   
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TABLE 9, (COUNTRY AND SAMPLE WIDE AVERAGES FOR POLITICAL VALUES) 
COUNTRY 
12. country needs 
more restrictions on 
Immigration 
13. country should 
redistribute income 
14. country needs a 
strong leader 
Austria 6.2 7.1* 3.5 
Bulgaria 8.3* 8.3 8.0 
Estonia 6.8 8.3* 6.4 
France 5.8 7.7* 6.7 
Germany 5.5 6.9* 3.4 
Hungary 6.6 8.6* 7.6 
Italy 7.0 7.5* 6.5 
Latvia 6.6 8.4* 8.3 
Netherlands 7.2* 6.8 6.5 
Poland 4.7 7.9* 5.8 
Romania 5.4 9.0* 7.9 
Slovakia 5.9 8.4* 6.6 
Spain 5.2 8.1* 7.3 
Sweden 5.4 7.0* 3.4 
UK 5.4 6.8* 5.7 
    
weighted sample means 5.8 7.6 5.9 
 
 
Concluding this block of questions, Q15 asks about citizen attitudes toward future expansion of the 
EU.  However, as opposed to a general question, we elect to introduce an experimental-type question 
with four randomized groups to test whether the mention of certain countries increases of decreases 
support.  In the control group, respondents simply hear the following: 
Q15a: “The EU should continue to let more countries become members, under the condition that they meet all of EU’s 
membership requirements” 
In the three treatment groups, we elect to insert a specific country to see if this alters the results in a 
significant way.   
Q15b. “The EU should continue to let more countries become members, SUCH AS NORWAY, under the condition 
that they meet all of EU’s membership requirements” 
Q15c. “The EU should continue to let more countries become members, SUCH AS TURKEY, under the condition 
that they meet all of EU’s membership requirements” 
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Q15d.  “The EU should continue to let more countries become members, SUCH AS SERBIA, under the condition 
that they meet all of EU’s membership requirements” 
 
TABLE 10, (SUPPORT FOR EU EXPANSION: SAMPLE AND COUNTRY MEANS)  
COUNTRY a. control group b. Norway group c. Turkey group  d. Serbia group  
Austria 4.4 6.5* 3.6 4.7 
Bulgaria 6.8 7.9 4.1 8.1* 
Estonia 5.1 7.3* 3.3 4.6 
France 4.1 6.2* 2.9 3.7 
Germany 5.5 6.7* 3.9 5.1 
Hungary 7.8 8.0* 6.4 7.4 
Italy 5.8 6.3* 5.4 5.7 
Latvia 6.3 7.8* 4.8 5.5 
Netherlands 6.7 6.9* 6.3 5.9 
Poland 7.3 7.7* 6.5 7.3 
Romania 7.6 8.1* 7.9 8.0 
Slovakia 6.7 7.6* 3.6 6.0 
Spain 7.6 8.3* 6.5 7.1 
Sweden 7.0* 6.7 3.1 6.6 
UK 5.9 6.2* 5.6 5.2 
weighted sample means 6.0 (n=4281) 7.0 (n=4286) 4.8 (n=4290) 5.8 (n=4290) 
Note: weighted country means reported.  Groups randomly determined.  Red and blue figures represent country highs and lows on 
each column, while *indicates high in country row. 
In Table 10, we see fairly Luke-warm feelings toward future expansion in general, with a sample mean 
of 6 out of 10 in the control group which asks about EU expansion in general without being specific 
of any particular candidate country.  Hungary, Romania and Spain are most positive about expansion 
in general, while France, Austria and Estonia are generally least positive.  In the other columns, the 
country means of preferences for expansion are shown when specifying the three selected countries.   
In all cases but one (somewhat ironically Sweden), does country level support increase for EU ex-
pansion when Norway is the country specified.  The overall sample average is a full point higher than 
the control group (7 versus 6), while in France, Estonia and Austria, the average increase by over two 
points.  When Turkey was specified however, the mean drops to 4.8, with respondents in most coun-
tries showing considerably lower support for expansion in this scenario. For example, relative to the 
control group, support is almost two points lower in Bulgaria and Estonia, while we see approxi-
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mately a 3 and 4 point lower mean in Slovakia and Sweden respectively.  However, support for ex-
pansion actually increases slightly in Romania. Finally, when inserting Serbia into the question, sup-
port is slightly lower on whole (5.8 versus 6), yet some country level variation is observed – while in 
most countries there is a slight decrease, in Bulgaria, Austria and Romania, the support is slightly 
higher than in the control group.  
VII. Perceptions of Corruption in Governing Bodies 
In Q16a-c, the respondents were asked about the extent to which they perceive corruption is ‘wide-
spread’ in three institutions: the EU, their national level and regional level.  We find that on average, 
Europeans believe that their national level governing institutions are most likely to be corrupt, fol-
lowed by the EU and their regional institutions.  In the table above, we look at the breakdown by 
country.  With respect to the EU, the perception is generally that there is a moderate-to-high level of 
corruption there, in that the mean sample response is 6.2 and the range of country averages is from 
a low of 5.5 (Romania) to 7.0 (Slovakia). 
Q16: On a 0-10 scale, with ‘0’ being that ‘there is no corruption’ and ‘10’ being that corruption is widespread, how 
would you rate the following institutions? 
a. The European Union 
b. (COUNTRY’s) national governing institutions 
c. Your regional/local governing institutions 
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TABLE 11, (COUTRY AND SAMPLE MEANS OF PERCIEVED CORRUPTION)  
COUNTRY a. European Union b. National institutions c. Regional institutions 
Austria 5.8* 5.4 5.2 
Bulgaria 5.7 7.7* 7.1 
Estonia 5.7 5.9* 5.4 
France 6.5 6.6* 6.2 
Germany 5.6* 5.1 5.2 
Hungary 6.7 7.5* 5.9 
Italy 7.0 7.8* 7.2 
Latvia 6.7 7.8* 6.6 
Netherlands 6.3* 5.5 5.4 
Poland 5.8 6.5* 5.6 
Romania 5.5 8.6* 8.0 
Slovakia 7.0 8.5* 7.2 
Spain 6.9 8.7* 7.5 
Sweden 5.9* 4.5 4.3 
UK 6.0* 5.6 5.1 
    
weighted sample means 6.2 6.7 6.1 
 
 
 
Generally, national governments are perceived to be more corrupt sample-wide, yet there is more 
variation in country-level responses. While some, such as Spain, Romania, Italy, Latvia, Bulgaria and 
Slovakia perceive corruption to be quite high (all 7.7 and above), people in countries such as Austria, 
Germany, UK, Netherlands and Sweden tend to perceive national level corruption as considerably 
lower (all 5.5 and below).  Regional governing institutions are thought on average to be the least 
corrupt, but again we observe quite large country-level variation, with Swedish respondents perceiv-
ing quite low corruption here (4.3) while Romanian regional authorities are perceived as highly cor-
rupt (8.0).   Interestingly, countries also differ in the order in which they rank corruption among the 
three levels of governing institutions.  For example, while some rank their region least, followed by 
their country and then the EU, such as Sweden, Austria, UK and Netherlands, others perceive the 
EU as least corrupt followed by their reginal and national intuitions respectively, such as Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Italy.  Only in Germany do we see that people collectively rate the 
national level the least corrupt of the three, yet just by a small margin (5.1 versus 5.2 for the regional 
level).   
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VIII. Evaluations of the economy and perceptions of one’s regional economic standing 
in the EU 
Q17: “How satisfied are you with the current economic situation in your region today?”  
Very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat unsatisfied, very unsatisfied 
FIGURE 6, (RESPONSES BY COUNTRY)  
 
In Q17 and Q18, the respondents are asked about their present-day evaluations of the economic 
situation in their regional as well as the present day compare to about 5 years ago.  In Q17 regarding 
the present day, we see quite a bit of national level variation.  Over 80% of Germans, Austrians and 
Dutch are ‘very satisfied’ or somewhat satisfied’, while just 38% of Italians claim similar responses.  
In six countries – France, Italy, Romania, Latvia, Spain and Bulgaria, we observe that less than half 
are satisfied while in the other countries over half are satisfied.  Germany has the most ‘very satisfied’, 
while Bulgaria has the most that are ‘least satisfied’ with the current day economy.   
When looking at the recent change in the economic conditions in one’s region during the last five 
years (Q18), people in most countries believe that things are about the same.  However, in most 
places, a much higher proportion feel that the economic conditions have gotten better than worse, 
such as in Germany, Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Austria, Bulgaria and Netherlands.  More-
over, in Poland, a majority (58%) state that the economy is better in their area than five years ago, 
which is more than a six-fold difference when compared with Italian respondents answering the same 
  32 
category (9%).  In other countries, more respondents claim the economy has gotten worse in the past 
five years than those claiming it has gotten better, such as in Italy, Spain, Sweden, France and Latvia.   
Q18: “compared with (5 years ago), do you think the economy in your region is: better, about the same, worse” 
FIGURE 7, (ECONOMIC COMPARED TO FIVE YEARS AGO EVALUATION BY COUNTRY)  
 
Due to the progressive redistributive nature of the main policy in question – Cohesion Policy – we 
draw on a wealth of research from previous works on preferences for redistribution which argue that 
citizens’ perceptions of where they stand economically tends to affect their preferences for both 
interpersonal and regional redistribution (for example, see Cruces et al 2013; Balcells et al 2015).  Q19 
tries to capture the extent to which people are aware of their region’s relatively wealth (and thus the 
amount they would expect to receive), which may influence their preferences for a policy such as CP.  
Here citizens are asked to place their region into one of four groups – from wealthiest to poorest in 
terms of GDP per capita.  Four groups were selected for the sake of simplicity as well as the very 
close overlap between regions into the various quartiles and their status as less developed (lowest 
quartile), transitioning (third quartile) or more developed (top two quartiles).   
Q19: (RANDOMIZED QUESTION) 
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Control group receives question, yet does not receive treatment information. 
Treatment group receives question and then receives information5  
1.  “in terms of the per person economic wealth, as in GDP per head, if we were to rank all EU regions 
from wealthiest to poorest and put them into four equal groups, with group 1 being the wealthiest group 
and 4 the poorest group, which of the 4 groups do you believe your region is in today? 
a. Group 1 (In the wealthiest 25% of EU regions) 
b. Group 2 
c. Group 3 
d. Group 4 (The poorest 25% of EU regions) 
 
Figure 8 below shows a summary of the percentage of respondents who correctly identified their 
region’s group, while the following figure highlights the selected case study regions.  Darker shades 
equal higher percentages.  It is also worth noting that the number of observations is not equal across 
regions, thus some of these estimates are based on less than 20 respondents in some cases.  None-
theless, we observe that the wealthiest and poorest regions are most likely to correctly identify their 
region’s group.  For example, 89% and 83% of residents in Nord Vest (RO11) and Severozapad 
(BG31) correctly placed their region in group 4, while those in Stockholm (SE11), Bayern (DE2) and 
Hamburg (DE6) were correct in placing their region in the wealthiest group 67%, 56% and 55% 
respectively.  Notably, citizens in the wealthy capital regions in poorer countries such as Bratislava, 
Bucharest, Mazawoskie and Budapest were among the least likely to correctly place their regions in 
the correct group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 See appendix for a demographic comparison of the two groups  
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FIGURE 8, (PROPORTION ‘CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED’ REGIONAL GROUP)  
 
 
IX. Questions measuring support for Cohesion Policy 
Measuring public support for Cohesion Policy is not as straightforward as other policy areas, such as 
support for the Euro, which can be asked more or less directly.  Previous Eurobarometer surveys of 
‘Awareness of Regional Policy in the EU’ show a relatively consistent and low level of awareness 
throughout the EU over the past eight years in which the question was asked to the public6.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 The question was framed in each Eurobarometer survey: ”Europe provides financial support to regions and cities.  Have 
you heard about and EU co-financed projects to improve the area where you live?” 
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FIGURE 9, (AWARENESS OF EU REGIONAL POLICY)  
 
Note: weighted EU averages of each response reported.  
In addition, the Eurobarometer has also tried to indirectly capture the level of support for CP – by 
asking “do you support investing on ‘all regions’ or ‘only poor regions’ for example.  Such question 
formulation is insufficient for our purposes for two reasons.  First, the Eurobaromter survey has not 
allowed for people NOT to support this idea – that is top say giving people an option of ‘not wanting 
to spend at all’ or something to this effect.   Second, there is not a sense of the intensity with which 
people may or may not like the idea of CP.  Q20 and Q21 try to remedy these shortcomings 
Due to relatively low awareness of the policy in question – in particular in wealthy northern EU 
countries (Eurobarometer 2013; 2015), respondents are given a bit of primer information about the 
policy in question prior to the question:  
Priming information: ‘As you might have heard, EU cohesion policy aims to reduce regional differences within the EU 
in things like economic development, and employment.  While all members contribute and receive some funds, the 
wealthier EU countries generally contribute more and poorer EU regions receive more funding on average.’ 
Q20.  “In your opinion, the EU should continue this policy, where wealthier countries contribute more, and poorer 
EU regions receive more funding.”  1. Strongly agree, 2. Agree, 3. Disagree, 4. Strongly disagree, 5. don’t know 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
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yes no
d/k
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Figure 10 shows a breakdown of supporting CP from Q20 by country.  Here the bar graph shows 
the proportion of respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ and ‘agreed’.  The results reveal some significant 
country-level differences.  While all countries on average show a relatively high degree of support for 
CP in general (weighted country average = 79%), there is a 24% gap between the lowest supporter 
(Netherlands 67%) and the highest (Slovakia 91%).  Newer member states (in general the largest 
recipients of CP) are most likely to agree with Q20 – with the highest support coming from Slovakia, 
Romania, Poland and Hungary, with E15 country Spain also in the top five.  Older members, with 
the exception of Estonia, tend to be less favorable.  Looking at the two responses separately, Bulgaria 
and Spain have the highest proportion of ‘strongly agree’, while Netherlands and Italy have the lowest 
in such response category.  
FIGURE 10, (SUPPORT FOR COHESION POLICY - STRONGLY AGREE AND AGREE - BY COUTRY)  
 
Note: weighted percentages reported.  Sample weighted average is 79% for strong agree or agree. 
Q21 continues to ask respondents of their support of the policy of CP, but instead of asking 
about the policy in general, they are asked about whether they would like tax money from 
their own countries to go more, about the same or less toward this policy.   
Q21.  In your opinion, compared with what it spends today, should (COUNTRY) contribute, more, about 
the same, or less to this EU policy? 1. More, 2. About the same, 3. Less 
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FIGURE 11 (PREFERENCES FOR SPENDING BY COUNTRY) 
 
Again, there are fairly clear-cut differences from country to country in terms of preferences for more 
or less spending on CP from one’s own country.  Romanian’s are on average the most enthusiastic, 
with 36% of respondents claiming that they would like their country to send more money toward 
CP, with just 6% saying less. Germany, Spain and Austria are more on the supportive side as well; all 
having larger proportions of respondents saying ‘more’ than ‘less’.  On the other side, respondents 
from the Netherlands are least supportive of investing more from their country’s tax base toward 
CP, with 39% saying ‘less’, and just 5% saying ‘more’.  In 6 of the countries in the sample – Hungary, 
Slovakia, Poland, Sweden, Estonia and Netherlands, we see support for more contributions from 
one’s own country on CP is under 10%, and all but four are under 20% in this respect.  However, 
over 30% of people in France, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, and UK want to spend less on CP.  People 
in Estonia and Poland are either the most satisfied (or the most indifferent) to CP, as roughly 70% 
or more support their country spending ‘about the same’ on CP. 
We then inserted several follow-up questions to Q21 in order to better understand some of the 
thinking behind the respondent’s answer to the sending question.  We base these questions on the 
literatures of public support for foreign aid, along with public support for domestic redistribution.  
If respondents answered ‘less’ on Q21, they received the following: 
5 39
6 26
8 29
8 20
258
9 27
2611
14 33
3514
14 34
3115
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1526
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Q22. a. (follow up if ‘less’ on q21): ): could you just tell me on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “Not agree at 
all” and 10 means “totally agree”, as to why you would want (COUNTRY’s) contribution to be less? 
TABLE 12, (REASONSFOR LESS SPENDING BY COUNTRY) 
 
Note: n=4151.  Note: 0-10 scale, higher scores = more strongly agree.   High and low country means for each question are in red 
and blue respectively.  *highest ranking value item within country 
 
22a1 asks about whether the money would be better spent at home, a common argument heard 
during Brexit debate.. On average, this answer seems to be most prominent across the sample, as the 
mean score is 7.9 of 10 – the highest among the 5 explanations. However, there is some clear variation 
across countries, as those that want their country to invest less in CP from Latvia and Slovakia clearly 
sympathize with this point (average response >9), while those in Bulgaria (4.4) and Austria (5.8) feel 
a.  the money (COUNTRY) pays would be better spent in (COUNTRY)  
b. the money will be largely wasted due to corruption  
c. the money only ends up helping wealthy EU regions in the end 
d. (COUNTRY) pays too much while other EU countries do not pay their fair share  
COUNTRY 
a.  the money 
(COUNTRY) pays 
would be better 
spent in (COUN-
TRY)  
b. the money will 
be largely wasted 
due to corruption  
c. the money only 
ends up helping 
wealthy EU re-
gions in the end 
d. (COUNTRY) pays 
too much while other 
EU countries do not 
pay their fair share  
e. (COUNTRY) should 
instead be helping the 
worlds’ poorest people, 
outside of the EU  
Austria 5.8 4.9 4.4 7.2* 4.7 
Bulgaria 4.4 6.9 7.3* 7.0 3.1 
Estonia 8.9* 7.0 6.0 5.8 3.3 
France 7.6* 7.1 5.8 7.1 4.4 
Germany 7.1 4.9 4.7 7.2* 5.8 
Hungary 8.7* 7.1 6.7 5.4 4.6 
Italy 7.6* 7.5 7.3 7.2 5.7 
Latvia 9.1* 7.7 6.7 6.6 5.9 
Netherlands 8.0 6.9 5.7 8.2* 5.7 
Poland 7.6* 6.1 5.8 5.4 4.7 
Romania 8.4 8.8* 6.9 6.3 5.1 
Slovakia 9.1* 8.4 5.6 6.8 5.8 
Spain 7.8 9.0* 6.1 6.6 6.1 
Sweden 8.5* 5.7 4.5 6.7 6.0 
UK 8.6* 6.5 5.7 7.3 5.6 
Total 7.9 7.0 6.1 6.8 5.2 
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less so.  On Q22a2, we see that Romanians and Spanish respondent who want their country to con-
tribute less to CP feel that the money is wasted due to corruption, while in Germany, Austria and 
Sweden this sentiment is much less important. Q22a3 captures skepticism found in some corners of 
the EU – that such investments made by CP only end up helping the rich areas in the end. We find 
this to have prominence among Bulgarians and Italians (mean response = 7.3) while Germans, Aus-
trians and Swedes do not share this sentiment. In Q22a4, another common explanation of Brexit is 
posed to respondents who want their country to contribute less to CP – that they already contribute 
too much to the EU budget to begin with while others do not pay enough.  People in the Netherlands, 
followed by UK and Italy most strongly identify with this, while Hungarians and Polish do not find 
this reason salient on average. Finally, although there are clear wealth disparities within the EU, it is 
also possible that citizens would simply rather spend their tax money abroad on the world’s poorest 
countries instead. On average, as we see in table 20, this point is least supported in the sample (sample 
mean=5.2), yet Swedes and Spanish respondents are most likely to feel this way, while this reason 
does not explain the thinking of Bulgarians and Estonians 
Q22b. (follow up if ‘more’ or ‘about the same’ on q21)  could you just tell me on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
“Not agree at all” and 10 means “totally agree” as to why you would want (COUNTRY’s) contribution to be 
(more/about the same)? 
a. It is in (COUNTRY’s) interest to invest in poorer regions  
b. It benefits everyone in the EU to invest in poorer regions  
c. “(COUNTRY) has a humanitarian obligation to end poverty throughout the EU” 
Q22b1-3 asks respondents about why they prefer about the same or more (with means from only 
‘more’ respondents from Q21 in parentheses).  In all three cases, the respondents found the expla-
nations compelling as to their reasoning for Q21’s response – the sample mean response for all of 
hose that receive Q22b question is 7 and above, and when considering only those that answered 
‘more’ in Q21, the means increase between 0.3 and 0.6 on average.  In all cases, the ‘more’ respond-
ents on Q21 from Sweden find the reasoning behind the three questions most compelling, while 
those in Estonia generally agree least strongly. 
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TABLE 13, (REASONS FOR MORE SPENDING BY COUNTRY) 
 
COUNTRY 
a. It is in (COUNTRY’s) inter-
est to invest in poorer re-
gions 
b. It benefits everyone in the EU 
to invest in poorer regions 
c. “(COUNTRY) has a humanitarian obli-
gation to end poverty throughout the 
EU” 
Austria 7.0 (7.3) 7.1 (7.6*) 6.6 (7.3) 
Bulgaria 8.6 (8.6) 8.8 (8.9*) 6.4 (8.3) 
Estonia 5.5 (6.9*) 6.3 (6.2) 5.5 (5.4) 
France 6.9 (7.6) 6.9 (7.5) 7.2 (7.7*) 
Germany 7.7 (7.9*) 7.7 (7.8) 6.6(7.3) 
Hungary 7.9 (8.1) 7.9 (8.6*) 6.5 (7.8) 
Italy 6.8 (7.6) 6.9 (7.8*) 6.8 (7.6) 
Latvia 6.6 (7.5*) 6.7 (6.8) 6.0 (6.7) 
Netherlands 6.6 (6.4) 6.6 (6.6) 6.7 (7.0*) 
Poland 8.3 (8.7*) 8.0 (8.5) 7.6 (8.6) 
Romania 5.6 (7.4) 6.2 (7.9*) 5.4 (6.6) 
Slovakia 8.1 (8.3*) 8.6 (8.3) 6.0 (7.1) 
Spain 7.2 (7.7) 7.8 (8.3) 7.7 (8.3*) 
Sweden 7.0 (8.8) 7.7 (9.3*) 6.9 (8.8) 
UK 7.1 (7.9) 7.8 (8.6*) 7.6 (8.6) 
Total 7.3 (7.7) 7.5 (8.0) 6.8 (7.6) 
Note: n= 12,996 (10,260=’about the same’, 2736=’more’ 
 
XI. Question on Brexit Voting (UK sample only) 
1UK. What did you vote in the BREXIT referendum? Leave, stay, didn’t vote, refused/d/k 
2UK. If the referendum were held today, how would you vote?  Leave, stay, didn’t vote, refused/d/k 
In Figure 12, Question UK1 shows that 55% chose stay, 30% chose Brexit, 13% abstained and 2% 
refused to answer.  This is a considerably larger proportion of ‘stay’ voters as well as having voted in 
general relative to the actual Brexit vote (compared with actual 51.9% leave, 48.1% stay, turnout 
72.2%).  We also see that in QUK2 some significant buyer’s remorse – 62% would vote ‘stay’ relative 
to 32% - mainly coming from those that abstained the first time. 
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FIGURE 12, (REPORTED VOTE ON PAST AND HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE BREXIT REFERENDUMS)  
 
Note: dark colors represent actual vote during referendum, while light colors express what respondents would vote for if Brexit 
referendum were held today.  N=1500 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1, (DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISION BETWEEN CONTROL AND TREATMENT GROUPS, SAM-
PLE WIDE. UNWEIGHTED) 
 
 
 
Gender % control % treatment difference p value 
female 50.5 50.4 0.1 0.84 
Age         
18-29 16.7 16.2 0.5 0.37 
30-49 32.5 32.9 -0.4 0.50 
50-64 27.2 26.9 0.3 0.63 
65+ 23.6 23.9 -0.3 0.58 
Education         
<secondary  20.4 20.2 -0.2 0.76 
Secondary 36.4 36.7 -0.3 0.65 
Tertiary 29.0 28.8 0.2 0.74 
post-grad 14.2 14.3 -0.1 0.88 
Population         
<10k 32.6 33.0 -0.4 0.58 
10k-100k 38.3 38.0 0.3 0.65 
100k-1m 20.0 20.7 -0.7 0.21 
>1m 7.9 7.0 
0.9* 0.02 
Income         
low 28.6 28.5 0.1 0.96 
medium 28.9 28.5 5.0 0.53 
high 35.0 35.7 -0.7 0.36 
d/k, refuse 7.5 7.3 0.2 0.60 
Employment         
public sector employee 20.3 20.5 -0.2 0.75 
private sector employee 25.6 25.6 0.0 0.99 
self-employed 10.9 11.0 -0.1 0.86 
unemployed 6.1 6.2 -0.1 0.68 
housewife/husband 4.3 4.1 0.2 0.63 
retired 26.4 26.3 0.1 0.89 
student/trainee 4.2 4.0 0.2 0.41 
other 2.1 2.2 -0.1 0.81 
Note: results of differences of proportions test by each category.  P-values based on two-tailed tests.. *p<0.05 
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Further description on weights: Design, Population and Post Stratification Weights of 
PERCEIVE Survey Data 
1. Design weights (Dweight) –  
Design weights are included to compensate for the fact that certain people have a higher or lower 
likelihood of being selected for the survey than others.  As the PERCEIVE survey is one that draws 
an extra number of respondents from certain NUTS 2 regions (selected case study region), all re-
spondents do not have the same likelihood of selection within countries.  As there is a regional focus 
to this project, we are also interest in sub-national level and thus we seek to achieve regional balance 
in terms of proper proportional representation across regions within countries.  This is useful when 
making country averages so that more (less) populous regions receive greater (lesser) weights than 
rural ones to compensate for the fact that their sample size is equal in the survey data.  Although for 
all analyses it is important to use the Dweight, it is especially important for country comparisons, 
means, proportions, etc. to use the design weights, otherwise results will likely be biased.   
The Dweight is equal to [Population size aged 18 years and above in 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑥 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑦]/[(Net 
sample size of 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑥 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑦].  It therefore has a mean value of ‘1’ in each country.  In all 
cases but Germany, Sweden and the UK (which use NUTS 1)  NUTS 2 weights are applied7 
2. Population weight (Pweight) –  
The population weight is included for comparisons across countries and is included to adjust for a 
country’s proportion in the sample relative to its actual population of the total population of all 
countries in the survey.  The weights are thus at the country level and do not need to be included for 
single country, regional level analyses or analyses where comparing country averages of certain survey 
items are of interest where the country-level is the primary unit of comparison.  However, in obtain-
ing sample-wide (or EU-wide) means or proportions, it is recommended to use the population 
weights.  
The Pweight helps to correct for any potential bias in obtaining means, proportion, etc when com-
bining data from two or more countries.  Without the Pweight, the researcher risks (most often) over-
                                                     
7 The exception in Sweden and UK are the two case study regions, which get weighted at NUTS 2, and we thus make 
adjustments for the remaining population of their remaining respective NUTS 2 regions.  
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represent smaller countries at the expense of larger ones. The Pweight thus is included to adjust so 
that every country is represented in relative proportion to its population size of the countries in the 
sample for each year. The population size weight is calculated as PWEIGHT=[Population size aged 
18 years and above]/[(Net sample size in country)].   
Population data of the population is taken from Eurostat for the year 2016. 
3. Individual level demographic weights (Iweight) 
The PERCEIVE survey employs a random sampling technique that does not involve quotas (other 
than NUTS regions) or stratification on demographic categories across individuals, such as gender.  
The post stratification weights thus help to adjust the sample to better match the population on 
general demographic characteristics.  In this case, gender and age are included (see the variables ‘D1’ 
and ‘D3recoded’).  Population data is taken from Eurostat for all countries.   Cross-tabulations from 
the population data were then collected and put together for each country and region and were com-
pared with that of the cross tabulations in the sample at the NUTS 1 level for all countries, with the 
exception of the NUTS 2 case study regions.  The PSweights were calculated based on differences 
between the sample and population cells, such that demographic groups (younger males for example) 
that were over (under) sampled relative to the population receive a lower (higher) weight.   
4. Post-stratification weights (PSweight) 
The PSweights are a combination of the design weights (Dweight) and the individual level weight 
(Iweight).  PSweights are recommended when comparing means, proportions, etc. across regions 
and/or countries to correct for sampling issues, in particular when comparing regions within coun-
tries with  a selected region which is over-sampled.  However, for more sophisticated, multilevel 
statistical analyses, the researcher can/should include additional demographic controls as independ-
ent variables in the model, such as income or age for example.   
Weighting truncations and re-scaling 
To avoid extreme weighting values, the PSweight values are truncated at the 99th percentile of the 
distribution of the originally calculated design and post-stratification weight values.  This truncates 
the weights at the high end at about at values of ‘3.56’ and low of 0.06, applying to just 330 cases out 
of 17,147. Weights are then divided by the mean value of the sample to adjust for the sample size, 
giving the mean weight a value of ‘1’.   
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Missing data 
In the case of missing data, this outcome is coded ‘99’ in the dataset.  On the two post-stratification 
control variables (gender and education) in no case do we find that any country exceeds 1% of the 
total observations as missing values, thus we follow the standard practice of MCAR (missing com-
pletely at random assumption) and simply drop these observations from the weighting scheme.   
 
 
